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Do counter-proliferation policies help or hinder efforts at stopping terrorists from
using chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological (CBNR) weapons? Counter-
proliferation bounds the terrorist threat by reducing the vulnerability of US forces,
allied military units and even civilian populations to terrorist attack. It helps to deter
state-sponsored terrorism by bolstering the ability of US forces to retaliate with
massive conventional force or with nuclear weapons. Counter-proliferation also
probably helps to deter state-sponsored CBNR terrorism, although it has little effect on
individual terrorists or independent terrorist networks. It reduces the prospects of
terrorist incidents by helping to keep ‘surplus’ materials or weapons from entering
black markets. Because counter-proliferation policies harden US or allied forces to
terrorist attacks, however, counter-proliferation efforts might channel terrorists toward
softer (civilian) targets.
Does US counter-proliferation policy or the concept of counter-proliferation
help prevent terrorists from launching chemical, biological, nuclear or
radiological attacks?1 Is there a relationship between US counter-
proliferation and counter-terrorism policies? 
The answers to these questions are not at all obvious. Counter-
proliferation and counter-terrorism cut across existing conceptual, policy
and organizational boundaries. Identifying relationships between counter-
terrorism and counter-proliferation thus represents a research question of
immediate theoretical and policy significance, especially since some
analysts believe that terrorists want to arm themselves with nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons.2
Serious technical and operational obstacles will limit the ability of
terrorists to employ radiological, chemical or biological weapons to
generate mass casualties and a classic social science debate exists about
whether preparing for the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by
terrorists is worth the opportunity costs involved.3 But the destruction of the
World Trade Center demonstrates that mass casualty terrorism has arrived.
CBNR weapons might be increasingly attractive to terrorist groups,
especially if they want to launch attacks that replicate or top the level of
death and destruction that was achieved on September 11, 2001. 
Both officials and theorists treat counter-proliferation and counter-
terrorism as separate issues. Counter-proliferation largely deals with the
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struggle between those militaries or sovereign states that want to acquire,
threaten to use or actually employ chemical, biological or nuclear weapons
to achieve political or military objectives, and those that want to stop them.
Counter-terrorism is a term generally used to describe the efforts of states
against non-state actors (criminal organizations, separatist groups, fanatics,
etc.) that intend or try to use violence against civilian targets to achieve
political objectives or to create death and destruction for ideological or
millenarian reasons. 
This theoretical and policy compartmentalization is in turn reflected by
the division of responsibility for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation
among competing organizations within the US government, although it is
too early to tell if and how the new homeland defense organization and anti-
terrorist initiatives launched in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks
will integrate these responsibilities. 
The intelligence community, police agencies and special operations
units are generally concerned with preventing or responding to terrorist
attacks against US interests at home or abroad. By contrast, counter-
proliferation is a Department of Defense (DoD) activity that is intended to
eliminate or contain the threat posed by WMD primarily to US military
forces.4 Recent efforts to evaluate the WMD threat treat US counter-
terrorism and counter-proliferation policy as separate topics, although the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), redrafted in the wake of the
September 2001 terrorist attacks, highlights the relationship between DoD
and the newly created Office of Homeland Security.5
Even though theoretical concepts and bureaucratic preferences can
explain why no one has asked how counter-proliferation contributes to or
detracts from counter-terrorism efforts, it is equally clear that no good
logical or empirical reason emerges to dismiss the issue out of hand. In its
December 1999 report to President Clinton, for example, the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by James Gilmore (hereafter referred
to as the Gilmore report), offered judgments about the nature of the terrorist
threat. These judgements were based on the presence of an effective US
counter-proliferation capability, although Gilmore and his colleagues failed
to note specifically the way counter-proliferation helped to constrain the
terrorist threat.6
Theory, policy and organization have blinded us to the way that US
counter-proliferation efforts help to deter or prevent chemical, biological
and nuclear terrorism. Common cognitive biases also have slowed
widespread recognition of the negative interaction between counter-
proliferation and counter-terrorism policies and of the tradeoffs that might
have to be made between these two policies. Individuals often find it
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difficult to recognize the opportunity costs and unintended consequences
produced by the policies they advocate and adopt. They also find it difficult
to see how well-intentioned policies can produce negative consequences.7
Counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism are related in at least four
ways.8 First, counter-proliferation policy has bounded the terrorist threat by
cutting supplies to black markets and by reducing the incentives for state
sponsorship of WMD terrorism. Second, superior US conventional military
capabilities, which are bolstered in several ways by counter-proliferation
policies, force determined US adversaries to seek asymmetric responses,
including terrorism. To the extent that counter-proliferation policies harden
US military units and installations to terrorist attack, counter-proliferation
also might channel terrorists toward civilian targets. 
Third, US counter-proliferation efforts address key allied vulnerabilities
to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, further bounding the
terrorist threat. Fourth, potential policy and budgetary tradeoffs are looming
between counter-proliferation and a major component of counter-terrorism
policy, consequence management (the protection of civilian populations
from weapons effects following a successful terrorist attack). 
The increase in homeland defense efforts following the terrorist attacks
against the World Trade Center and Pentagon will only exacerbate the need
for tradeoffs between counter-proliferation and consequence management.
This article explores each of these claims and then concludes by offering
some observations about the relationship between counter-proliferation and
counter-terrorism.
Counter-proliferation and the Limits of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Current US counter-proliferation policy reflects the guidance laid out in the
May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which estimated that
chemical or biological weapons were likely to be used in future conflicts.9
The 1997 QDR called upon the Defense Department to undertake two
initiatives in response to this threat estimate. First, the Defense Department
was to institutionalize counter-proliferation by using the concept as an
organizing principle in every facet of military activity. US forces were to
prepare to operate in a WMD environment. Second, Defense was instructed
to ‘internationalize’ counter-proliferation to encourage allies and potential
coalition partners to train, equip and prepare their forces to operate alongside
US units in a nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare environment.10
Counter-proliferation is a multifaceted enterprise that embodies DoD efforts
to reduce and counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. 
Counter-proliferation addresses the ‘supply-side’ of the WMD issue by
reducing the availability of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons that
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might find their way into the hands of terrorists. Arms control and
nonproliferation efforts are an important part of counter-proliferation
because they can be used to constrain, roll back, or even prevent states from
acquiring unconventional weapons. 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program reduces the latent threat
posed by Soviet ‘legacy’ systems. By properly disposing of weapons that
are no longer needed, counter-proliferation helps keep obsolete munitions
and materials from falling into hostile hands. Similarly, US export controls
help to reduce the possibility that irresponsible or aggressive groups or
states will acquire weapons of mass destruction and associated
technologies. International norms against trafficking of dangerous materials
or weapons help prevent dual-use technologies from reaching black markets
and terrorists.
Counter-proliferation also embodies Defense Department efforts to
counter existing WMD capabilities by: (1) deterring the use of WMD
against US interests by denying adversaries their political or military
objectives; (2) defending US and allied forces and populations from missile
attack; (3) sustaining offensive and defensive military operations in a WMD
environment; and (4) preparing for chemical, biological or nuclear use
against US and allied civilians. 
By making military forces a less vulnerable target and by guaranteeing
that any use or prospective use of WMD will be preempted or met with
prompt retaliation, US counter-proliferation policy reduces the threat of
state-sponsored WMD terrorism. In other words, because counter-
proliferation helps to insure that US forces can retaliate after military units
or civilian targets suffer a WMD attack, American policy makers can make
credible deterrent threats that discourage state-sponsored terrorism.
Counter-proliferation efforts ‘bound’ the terrorist threat by reducing the
incentives for state-sponsored WMD terrorism and by limiting the
opportunities for states to transfer materials and technologies to non-state
actors to construct and use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
Counter-proliferation is an ex ante and costly indicator (witness the
financial and psychological costs of anthrax vaccination alone) of US
resolve that bolsters general deterrence.11
The assumption that US deterrent threats are credible is a cornerstone of
the Gilmore report, which dismisses the prospect of state-sponsored nuclear,
chemical or biological terrorism as extremely unlikely. According to
Gilmore, the threat of US conventional preemption – here the 1998 cruise
missile attack on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan
comes to mind – or nuclear retaliation in the aftermath of a mass casualty
terrorist incident creates enormous disincentives for states to become
involved in terrorism.12
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These disincentives apparently are clear even to so-called ‘rogue states’:
despite accesses to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, no state has put
its unconventional arsenal at the disposal of terrorists, although it is too
early to tell if the anthrax attacks suffered in the United States in October
2001 has a link to a state sponsor.13 The benefits of even a successful state-
sponsored terrorist attack against US forces might be short-lived. US forces
are preparing to operate effectively in the wake of a WMD attack; terrorism
directed against US military units should only prove to be a limited setback
on the battlefield. The price for this temporary setback, however, could be
severe retaliation once the sponsor of a terrorist attack has been identified.
Deterrent threats strengthened by counter-proliferation, however, would
be less effective if they were directed at terrorists that lack state sponsors.
Independent terrorists probably would expect to avoid symmetrical
retaliation. They also might hope to escape discovery. If discovered, they
might pose an inappropriate target for retaliation. Indeed, if terrorists
embraced a millenarian philosophy or objective, they might even welcome
severe retaliation.14 The objectives of the Heaven’s Gate cult, for example,
were literally suicidal. 
Terrorism as an Asymmetric Threat
To the extent that counter-proliferation policies provide escalation
dominance on the battlefield, they help limit conflict to the conventional
level of combat, a level where US forces have repeatedly demonstrated their
ability to overwhelm adversaries. This escalation dominance also enhances
US deterrent threats, which reduce incentives for states to sponsor terrorist
activities. 
But counter-proliferation, combined with US dominance of the
conventional battlefield, could produce an unwelcome paradox: counter-
proliferation might increase the likelihood of WMD terrorism by forcing
adversaries to find asymmetric responses to US conventional superiority.15
As David Kay notes in his assessment of the terrorist challenge, ‘nations
will seek courses of action that will allow them operational freedom from
US conventional attack or, at least, the ability to inflict significant losses on
the United States if it does attempt to frustrate their ambitions and military
actions’.16 Terrorism supplies an asymmetric response to US dominance of
conventional battle, although likely US adversaries would never want to
take credit for a successful terrorist attack.
Because counter-proliferation also channels terrorist attacks away from
relatively hard military targets, terrorists might find it easier to direct
chemical or biological attacks against civilian, transportation or industrial
targets that would have an impact on the course of conventional battle. In
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other words, counter-proliferation channels attacks away from well-prepared
military units towards relatively unprepared civilian or logistical targets.
History, theory and recent events appear to undermine this claim about
the effect of counter-proliferation policy. Ideology, technology and political
objectives, not just vulnerabilities, have shaped the four distinct waves of
terrorist activity that have emerged over the last century. Recent history also
suggests that the ongoing fourth wave of ‘sacred terrorism’ focuses on
military or government targets.17 Attacks against the US Marines deployed in
Lebanon in 1983, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 US embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the October 2000 attack against the USS
Cole, and the September 11 attack against the Pentagon demonstrate that US
military and government installations and units are the terrorist targets. 
Although they do not provide blanket protection from terrorism, US
forces employ tactics and equipment that reduce their vulnerability to
WMD terrorist attacks. US military personnel are equipped with personal
and collective protective equipment (suits, masks and shelters). Units are
also equipped with point and standoff chemical and biological agent
detectors that can reduce exposure to these hazards by warning of their
presence in the environment. Decontamination equipment and medical
countermeasures (vaccines and antidotes) also reduce the potential damage
that might be inflicted by chemical and biological agents on US forces. 
US military forces are more accessible to terrorist attack because they
are forward deployed and often operate in chaotic environments. But,
because of extensive defensive preparations, forward-deployed forces are
not a particularly lucrative target for terrorists armed with chemical or
biological weapons. US military units have the equipment and training
needed to mitigate the impact of a WMD terrorist incident, pushing
terrorists to find more lucrative (vulnerable) targets.
Counter-proliferation and Coalition Warfare
If American units find themselves in high-intensity conventional combat,
they probably will be participating in an international coalition. Coalition
warfare is important to the US because it demonstrates the overwhelming
political commitment of the United States and the international community
to stop aggression and egregious abuses of human rights. Coalitions,
however, can be politically fragile. Opponents often attack an alliance by
destroying its political cohesion, demonstrating to alliance members the
unavoidable fact that the risks and benefits of warfare are not shared equally
among the members of the coalition. 
Indeed, this was Saddam Hussein’s intent during the Gulf War when Iraq
attacked Israeli cities using SCUD missiles. Unable to stop the Gulf War 
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coalition militarily, Saddam sought to stop it politically by attempting to
turn the war into an Arab-Israeli dispute, not a battle to end Iraqi aggression.
If allied populations and militaries are vulnerable to state and non-state
WMD terrorism, US-led coalitions might find themselves increasingly
vulnerable to terrorist blackmail. Because counter-proliferation efforts have
reduced the impact that WMD terrorism might have on forward-deployed
US units, allied populations and militaries could be viewed as appropriate
targets within easy reach of terrorist groups. By showing that allied
governments are unable to protect their citizens, terrorism could undermine
allied support for coalition operations by undermining popular support of
allied governments themselves.18 The possibility that asymmetric responses
might occur to US conventional superiority and the logic of coalition
warfare coincide to identify allied military forces and populations as a
tempting target for terrorist attacks.
Counter-proliferation further bounds the terrorist threat by hardening
allied military and civilian targets against terrorist attacks. International
counter-proliferation and consequence management preparations are
valuable counter-terrorism instruments. The United States has launched two
major regional initiatives to improve the ability of forward-deployed US
forces and local allies to respond to the threat posed by chemical, biological
and nuclear terrorism. 
On the Korean peninsula, for instance, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the South Korean Ministry of Defense have undertaken a series
of initiatives to improve the ability of South Korean and US forces to deter
and defend against weapons of mass destruction. US and South Korean
officials also have opened a dialogue to facilitate counter-proliferation
planning. As a result, combined military exercises now include nuclear,
chemical and biological warfare scenarios. Additionally, the Koreans
established a new Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Defense
Command in June 1999 and have included funding for improved protective
and detection equipment in their 1999 defense budget.19
The Defense Department also has launched a Southwest Asia
Cooperative Defense initiative. The initiative is intended not only to
improve the ability of US and coalition forces to operate in a CBW
environment, but also to improve the ability of host nations to protect their
populations and industry from chemical and biological weapons attacks.
Already, extensive cooperation is planned in four areas: (1) Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence (C4I) and shared early
warning; (2) active air and missile defense; (3) passive defense (force
protection and sustainment of military operations following chemical or
biological attack); and (4) consequence management.20
As potential ‘front-line’ states, US friends and allies on the Korean
peninsula and in Southwest Asia are particularly vulnerable to both state
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and non-state sponsored acts of terrorism. Although the initiatives currently
underway do not completely eliminate the threat posed by WMD terrorism,
especially to the civilian populations of America’s allies, they are a logical
first step in closing off a ‘window of opportunity’ for terrorists.
Counter-proliferation vs. Consequence Management
Although US counter-proliferation policy has helped reduce the threat
posed by state-sponsored WMD terrorism directed against US forces, allies
and even civilians, it has done little to reduce the threat posed by non-state
actors to the US population. According to the Gilmore report, this threat is
real, although it has been mischaracterized. Gilmore and his colleagues
believe that there is a high probability that a low-casualty event will occur
in the United States involving some type of ‘mass casualty’ device. 
Terrorists lacking state sponsors probably do not have the technical
expertise, equipment and materials needed to construct or use nuclear,
biological, chemical or radiological weapons to inflict casualties and
destruction on a truly massive scale. Instead, Gilmore suggests that
poisonings, agricultural sabotage or product tampering seem to be plausible
activities for terrorist organizations, a prediction that may be coming to
pass, especially if the October 2001 anthrax infections are linked to the Al-
Qaeda network. Clearly, counter-proliferation can do little if anything to
address this sort of activity.
If officials really do believe that non-state actors pose a serious WMD
threat to the United States and that these individuals cannot be deterred,
preempted or arrested before they strike, then significant material and
personnel resources must be devoted to deal with the consequences of a
WMD attack against civilians. ‘First-responders’ need to learn how to deal
with chemical or biological weapons; without training and equipment,
police, firefighters and paramedics actually can spread pathogens or toxins,
thereby producing more casualties. Vaccines or antidotes need to be made
available to contain disease outbreaks or to save the lives of people exposed
to deadly agents. Military organizations, here the National Guard comes to
mind, must equip, train and prepare to act rapidly to contain and reduce
weapons effects in large urban areas. A whole new set of strategies,
protocols, doctrines and tactics needs to be developed to counter the effects
of terrorist attacks.
Viewed in isolation, consequence management is no small task. Further
complicating matters is the fact that counter-proliferation and consequence
management differ fundamentally. Counter-proliferation initiatives
primarily involve military forces and are directed against threats located
outside of the United States. Counter-proliferation is intended to deter or
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prevent acts of state and even non-state sponsored terrorism before they
occur. In contrast, consequence management is intended to limit the impact
of a failure of counter-proliferation policy to prevent a WMD terrorist attack
against civilians.
Counter-proliferation and consequence management policies will soon
present policy makers with significant tradeoffs in terms of budgets,
personnel, organizational structures and philosophies that govern the fight
against WMD terrorism. So far, these tradeoffs have not received much
attention from those involved in either counter-terrorism or counter-
proliferation. But as the urgency to respond to the 2001 September terrorist
attacks increases, lawmakers, government officials and military officers
might confront several stark dilemmas.
First, throughout the twentieth century, US efforts to counter the effects
of chemical or biological weapons have been undertaken with military units
in mind. For example, troops likely to encounter biological weapons are
vaccinated, but similar efforts to vaccinate entire populations would be
enormously expensive and possibly counterproductive. Anti-toxins issued
to soldiers are extraordinarily potent agents which could themselves create
a public health hazard if issued in peacetime to American households.
Military personnel are supplied with expensive equipment that requires
extensive training for proper utilization. 
It is unrealistic to believe, however, that average citizens can be
equipped and trained in peacetime to the high standards needed to operate
sophisticated chemical and biological weapons detection devices or to
utilize protective equipment properly. In other words, equipment and
techniques used to protect military formations and personnel cannot simply
be given to fire departments to help protect a local population.
Second, although counter-proliferation initiatives can constrain non-
state actors by drying up black markets in contraband materials and
equipment or by deterring state support to terrorist groups, counter-
proliferation policy is primarily directed against threats that can be
identified in geographic terms, if not always by national origin. Counter-
proliferation policy is intended to strengthen the capability of US forces to
operate in a chemical, biological or nuclear environment, a setting which
implies war between recognized national entities. 
In this sense, counter-proliferation policy reflects the state-centric bias
of America’s armed forces, which prepare to fight roughly similar units in
opposing military organizations. Counter-proliferation policy only
addresses non-state threats in a tertiary manner because it supports a US
military that views non-state threats as a minor concern. Increased emphasis
on consequence management thus reflects a fundamental shift in American
defense priorities.
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Third, to combat WMD terrorism better, consequence management and
counter-proliferation policies must be better coordinated. But this
coordination would have to occur at the weakest point in US security: at the
bureaucratic and legal nexus between foreign and domestic policy. Further
complicating matters is the fact that even though counter-proliferation is
organized by DoD, the domestic response to terrorism is loosely organized.
The Gilmore report noted, for example, that today the scope or severity of
an incident involving a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon would
determine which (local, state, federal) agency would take the lead in
responding to a terrorist incident.21
Terrorism cuts across national, bureaucratic and jurisdictional borders,
but the American effort to stop terrorism has a long way to go before it too
is a seamless enterprise. One can only hope that the new Homeland Defense
Organization can respond effectively to this challenge. 
Conclusion
Counter-proliferation contributes to counter-terrorism in several significant
ways. It bounds the terrorist threat by reducing the vulnerability of US
forces, allied military units and even civilian populations to terrorist attack.
It helps to deter state-sponsored terrorism by bolstering the ability of US
forces to retaliate with massive conventional force or with nuclear weapons. 
Although leaders that possess chemical, biological or even nuclear devices
might find common cause with some terrorist group, they apparently have
no desire to have their state linked to a terrorist attack involving
unconventional weapons. Counter-proliferation also reduces the prospects
of terrorist incidents by helping to keep ‘surplus’ materials or weapons from
entering black markets. Officials or analysts rarely mention these positive
contributions because counter-proliferation is not intended to address the
terrorist threat, although on occasion (for example, the Gilmore report) they
are factored into intelligence assessments or strategic calculations. 
Counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism also are linked in less
desirable ways. The dominance of US conventional forces compels
antagonists to seek asymmetric responses to American superiority on the
battlefield. To the extent that counter-proliferation bolsters this
conventional superiority by providing escalation dominance, it might
channel an enemy’s response to available targets (such as terrorist attacks
against civilians). Similarly, counter-proliferation policies that harden US or
allied forces to terrorist attack might channel terrorists toward softer
(civilian) targets. Unlike the positive contributions made by counter-
proliferation policy, officials and analysts are highly aware of the possibility
that opponents might use asymmetric attacks to respond to US conventional
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superiority. Concern about asymmetric attacks helps to blind observers to
the ways counter-proliferation bounds the terrorist threat.
The relationship between counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism,
however, is based on more than cognitive biases – risk averse officials and
analysts could be expected to be more aware of potential losses (domestic
terrorism) than existing gains (reduced threats against forward-deployed
military units). If fear of domestic terrorism continues to grow, significant
budgetary tradeoffs between counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation
might be looming on the horizon. These tradeoffs cannot be avoided
because many counter-proliferation initiatives simply cannot be used to
help in consequence management. 
Counter-proliferation is intended to help military units in battle against
relatively symmetrical state-sponsored military forces, while consequence
management closely resembles disaster management. Military units can
hope to defeat their opponents in battle, thereby avoiding the costs of defeat.
But disaster managers cannot defeat hurricanes; they can only take steps to
minimize the impact when disaster strikes. It is this difference in
fundamental objective that ultimately limits the possibility of simply
applying counter-proliferation capabilities in a counter-terrorism campaign,
and that will force policy makers to make difficult organizational and
budgetary choices in the years ahead. 
NOTES
1. This article is based on a paper entitled ‘Antiterrorism via Counter-proliferation’ presented
at the USAF Institute of National Security Studies, 7th Annual Topical Conference, National
Defense University, 27–28 July 1999. I would like to thank Peter Lavoy, James Smith and
David C. Rapoport and an anonymous reviewer for their insights and advice.
2. Richard Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction,’ Foreign Affairs Vol. 77, No. 1
(January/February 1998), pp.26–41. US officials have stated that members of the Al–Qaeda
(bin Laden network) have experimented with chemical weapons and have attempted to buy
nuclear ones. Kenneth Katzman, ‘Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors,
2001,’ (CRS, The Library of Congress, 10 September 2001) pp.11–12.
3. For eloquent statements of each side in this debate see David C. Rapoport, ‘Terrorism and
Weapons of the Apocalypse,’ National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1999, pp.49–67;
and David Kay ‘WMD Terrorism: Hype or Reality,’ in James M. Smith and William C.
Thomas (eds.), The Terrorism Threat and US Government Response: Operational and
Organizational Factors (USAF Institute of National Security Studies, Colorado Springs,
CO., 2001), pp.69–78. 
4. In February 1994, the National Security Council defined counter-proliferation as ‘the
activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of US efforts to combat
proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection
and analysis with particular responsibility for assuring that US forces and interests can be
protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction’. See
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology, Report on
Nonproliferation and Counter-proliferation Activities and Programs (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 1994), p.1.
5. For example, see David C. Rapoport, ‘Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,’ National
139COUNTER-TERRORISM VIA COUNTER-PROLIFERATION





































Security Studies Quarterly Vol. V. No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp.49–67; Ashton B. Carter and
Celeste Johnson, ‘Beyond the Counter-proliferation Initiative to a ‘Revolution in Counter-
proliferation Affairs’,’ National Security Studies Quarterly Vol. V. No. 3 (Summer 1999),
pp.83–90; and Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC Department of
Defense, 30 September 2001), pp.18–20.
6. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction, ‘Assessing the Threat,’ 15 December 1999.
7. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976); and Robert Jervis, System Effects (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1997). 
8. Similarly, analysts have claimed that the bureaucratic division of labor between US
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts protects organizational bailiwicks, but
undermines policy coherence. See Brian Bates and Chris McHorney, Counter-proliferation
in the 21st Century (Lewiston, NY: the Edwin Mellen Press, 2000).
9. The 2001 QDR simply notes that the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear weapons continues, see 2001 QDR, p.12. 
10. William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/sec7.html.
11. James D. Fearon, ‘Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests,’ Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 38/2 (June 1994), pp.236–269. 
12. ‘Assessing the Threat,’ pp.17–18.
13. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th
Century (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense
University, March 1999), p.37.
14. William C. Martel, ‘Deterrence and Alternative Images of Nuclear Possession,’ in T.V. Paul,
Richard Harknett and James J. Wirtz, (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms
and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998),
pp.213–234; and Walter Laqueur, ‘Postmodern Terrorism,’ Foreign Affairs
(September/October 1996), pp.24–36. 
15. On this point see Jonathan Tucker, ‘Asymmetric Warfare,’ Forum for Applied Research and
Public Policy 14/2 (Summer 1999), pp.32–38. 
16. Kay, p.74.
17. David C. Rapoport, ‘Terrorism’ Encyclopedia of Violence Peace and Conflict Vol. 3
(London: Academic Press, 1999), pp.497–510.
18. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, The Evolving Dynamic
(London: MacMillon, 1996), p.13; and Bruce Hoffmann, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations (Santa Monica: RAND P–8039, 1999),
pp.53–54.
19. Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Antiterrorism via Counter-proliferation,’ presentation delivered to USAF
Institute of National Security Studies 7th Annual Topical Conference, ‘Twenty–First Century
Terrorism and US National Security,’ National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 27–28
July 1999. 
20. Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Cooperative Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Arabian
Gulf,’ in Jacquelyn K. Davis, Charles M. Perry, and Jamal S. Al–Suwaidi (eds.), Air/Missile
Defense, Counter-proliferation and Security Policy Planning (Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1999), pp.51–57.
21. ‘Assessing the Threat,’ pp.61–62. 
140 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
143tpv05.qxd  30/10/02  11:05  Page 140
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
av
al 
Po
stg
rad
ute
 Sc
ho
ol,
 D
ud
ley
 K
no
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
5:3
6 1
2 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
